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Abstract
The determinants of human capital have been studied sparsely in the literature. Al-
though there is a huge literature on the determinants of schooling linked with the quality
of schooling, there are not many contributions that explore the deep determinants of
investment in, quantity and quality of human capital. This paper investigates the re-
lationship between human capital and the ancestral genetic diversity of populations. It
highlights a strong hump-shaped relationship between genetic diversity and human cap-
ital. This means that some of the human capital achievements nowadays may root to
the genetic diversity mostly determined many centuries ago. Results are robust to the
introduction of several controls, to a consideration of a proxy for human capital in 1500
and to IV estimation.
Keywords: human capital; genetic diversity; determinants of development; determi-
nants of human capital.
JEL Codes: I25, N10, N30, O10, O50, Z10.
1 Introduction
The determinants of human capital have been studied sparsely in the literature. Although
there is a huge literature on the determinants of schooling linked with quality of schooling,
resulting on a weak causality between inputs to schools and their results, there are not many
contributions that explore the deep determinants of investment, quantity and quality of hu-
man capital. Exceptions are the signicant eect that increased country-risk has in education
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measures, highlighted by Sequeira and Ferraz (2009) and Sequeira (2009). However, the lit-
erature on the deep determinants of development has experienced great development in the
last decade. Hall and Jones (1999) demonstrated the importance of social infrastructure, a
composed measure of law of rule and other institutional measures, in which is followed by
Glaeser et. al. (2004). It is interesting to note that this paper highlights the role of human
capital as a more signicant source of growth than institutions but do not show any causal
relationship between institutions and human capital. Rodrick et al. (2004) showed evidence
for the supremacy of institutions related to geography and integration as determinants of
economic development. In related literature on institutions, Engerman and Sokolo (2000) and
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) have stressed the role of colonialism, while the eects
of ethnolinguistic fractionalization were examined by Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina
et al. (2003). Moreover, the historical impact of sociocultural factors has been highlighted by
Barro and McCleary (2003), Tabellini (2008), and Guiso et. al. (2009).
Ashraf and Galor (2013) is probably one of the most inuential recent papers in the eld
of economic development.1 This paper found signicant relationship between genetic diversity
determined ancestrally and economic development nowadays. The hump-shaped relationship
exposed by the authors builds on two opposite eects of genetic diversity. First, an increase in
diversity enhances production possibilities due to complementarities between skills or abilities
of populations with dierent genetic roots. In fact, also some competition for survival, as
the natural selection explains, also increases adaptability and improving the society capacity
of introducing successfully superior technologies. However, after a certain level of genetic
diversity, further increases would increase the scope for disarray and mistrust, increasing the
probability of conict. While most of the reasoning due to which there may be a (non-linear)
causality between genetic diversity and development are due to accumulation of skills, there is
no attempt to explain present education outcomes with genetic diversity. This is the attempt
of this paper. In fact, increases in genetic diversity from relatively low levels increase struggle
for success which may enhance schooling investment and outcomes; also eventually after some
level of genetic diversity, the risk of conict increases and incentives to accumulate knowledge
decrease.2 Our paper describes exhaustively the relationship between several measures of
human capital and genetic diversity and tests its robustness in a cross-section of countries.
In Section 2, we describe the data. In Section 3, we present the main results, subject
to a number of extensions. In Section 4 we discuss results on robustness tests linked with
the introduction of continent dummies and instrumental variables estimations. Section 5
concludes.
2 Data and Sources
In this section we describe the variables and data sources for this work. Our dependent
variable is human capital, for which we use dierent measures - enrolments, attainments,
scores in international tests, and also measures of quality-adjusted stocks of human capital
1The paper was a lead article in American Economic Review and was the Science's Editor Choice in
September 2012.
2The micro causality between genes and education has also been subject to very recent debate from which,
the recent paper from Rietvelt et. al. (2013), in Science, is worth mentioning. The paper presents a statistical
signicant relationship between genes and educational attainment.
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(the product of scores and quantities of human capital). These alternative measures of human
capital were taken from Cohen and Soto (2007) - for measures of quantity of human capital
and from Hanushek and Woessmann (2012) - for measures of the quality of human capital.
We also use a measure of the relational capacity of human capital, using trust as a weight for
human capital. Trust were taken from Ashraf and Galor (2013), which used data from the
World Values Survey conducted during the period 1981-2008.
Explanatory variables rely on the database from Ashraf and Galor (2013), which include
variables that measure genetic diversity, both taken as adjusted to migratory movements and
ancestrally adjusted. For our benchmark analysis we use the ancestrally adjusted (to 2000)
predicted genetic diversity. As genetic diversity measured by this variable has been adjusted
to account for the 2000 composition of populations that can trace their ancestral origins to
dierent source countries in the year 1500, this is the appropriate measure to relate to the
distribution of human capital world wide after the year 2000. Other explanatory variables will
be introduced as controls later on.
Table 1 summarizes the used dependent variables, which intend to measure quantity and
quality of human capital, as well as quality-adjusted measures of years of schooling. The
variables school, m sec15c, m tyr15 and m tyr1565 measure quantity of schooling (years of
schooling or attainment). kskh measure schooling adjusted for social capital. This variable
intends to be a proxy of the relational capability of the existing human capital. Next four
variables (cognit, lows, basic, top) measure quality of schooling, available as tests scores and
share of students reaching certain levels of quality in international tests. and the nal four
variables measure human capital (quantity) weighted by quality (scores). We have also tested
other quality-weighted human capital variables, in which we substituted School by m sec15c,
m tyr15 and m tyr1565, alternatively. As results are quite similar to those obtained when
using the School variable, we choose not to report them. These results are available upon
request. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent variables. The explanatory
variables used - Predicted genetic diversity ancestry adjusted and Mobility index-predicted
genetic diversity ancestry adjusted, are pdiv aa e pdivhmi aa, respectively and measure, as
explained above, genetic diversity for 2000.
3 Results
In this section, we document the fact that there is an hump-shaped relationship between
dierent variables linked with human capital (quantity, quality and quality-adjusted measures)
and the genetic diversity of countries. We do this estimating OLS regressions. In the robustness
Section we disregard the potential endogeneity problem. We present gures (Figures 1 and 2)
and a table (Table 3). As become evident from the gures and the table there is a non-linear
relationship (in a hump-shaped form or of inverted-U) between human capital variables and
genetic diversity. This is common to the dierent measures of human capital that we used.
Moreover, interestingly this rough regression through dierent dependent variables predict
incredibly similar maximum values for the genetic diversity above which human capital tends
to decrease, which is around 0.70, which is slightly below the median value for these variables
(see Table 2). This means that there is a quite realistic value for genetic diversity below
which human capital increases with diversity and above which it decreases. Moreover this is
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Table 1: Human Capital Variables
Variables for Human Capital (HC) Name Measure (years and source)
Years of schooling of population+25 School 1960-2010 (Ashraf and Galor, 2013)
Social Capabilities of HC kskh Trust*School (Ashraf and Galor, 2013)
% of population + 15 with secondary education m sec15c 1960-2010 (Cohen and Soto, 2007)
Years of schooling of population +15, inc. students m tyr15 1960-2010 (Cohen and Soto, 2007)
Years of schooling of population 15-64 m tyr1564 1960-2010 (Cohen and Soto, 2007)
Average test score in math and science cognitive primary through secondary, all years 1964-2003 (Hanushek and
Woessmann, 2012)
Average test score in math and science lows lower secondary, all years 1964-2003 (Hanushek and Woess-
mann, 2012)
Share of students reaching basic literacy basic average test scores in math and science, primary through sec-
ondary, all years 1964-2003) (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2012)
Share of top-performing students top based on average test scores in math and science, primary to
secondary school, all years 1964-2003 (Hanushek and Woess-
mann, 2012)
Interaction between School and Cognitive Schoolxcognitive {
Interaction between School and lows Schoolxlows {
Interaction between School and basic Schoolxbasic {
Interaction between School and top Schoolxtop {
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
(a) pdiv aa .7267 .0269 .6279 .7743
(b) pdivhmi aa .7229 .02904 .6178 .7826
(1) school 4.8623 2.8126 .4089 10.8622
(2) kskh 1.8560 1.4717 .0661 5.7926
(3) m sec15c .1528 .1303 .0088 .5103
(4) m tyr15 5.6471 3.0635 .5183 11.7767
(5) m tyr1564 5.8586 3.2381 .5417 12.2517
(6) cognitive 4.5429 .5709 3.0893 5.3376
(7) lowsec 4.5369 .6120 2.6830 5.5116
(8) basic .7569 .2045 .1817 .9738
(9) top .0592 .05268 .0001 .2043
(10) schoolxcognitive 30.6408 13.7546 7.8473 53.2535
(11) schoolxlowsec 30.6199 13.8527 7.9422 53.5439
(12) schoolxbasic 5.3417 2.7852 .9131 9.9741
(13) schoolxtop .46392 .4049 .0013 1.3676
Notes: (a) Predicted genetic diversity ancestry adjusted; (b) Mobility index-predicted genetic diversity ancestry adjusted. Ancestry adjustment is
made to make variables consistent to time-measurement in 2000. Details are given in the Appendix F of Ashraf and Galor (2013).; (1) Years of
schooling; (2) Years of schoolingInterpersonal Trust; (3) % of population aged 15 or over with complete secondary education; (4) Years of schooling
of population 15 and over, whether studying or not; (5) Years of schooling of population 15-64 who is not studying; (6) Average test score in math
and science, primary through end of secondary school, all years (scaled to PISA scale divided by 100); (7) Average test score in math and science,
only lower secondary, all years (scaled to PISA scale divided by 100); (8) Share of students reaching basic literacy (based on average test scores in
math and science, primary through end of secondary school, all years); (9) Share of top-performing students (based on average test scores in math
and science, primary through end of secondary school, all years); (10) Years of schoolingAverage test score in math and science, primary through
end of secondary school; (11) Years of schoolingAverage test score in math and science, only lower secondary; (12) Years of schoolingShare of
students reaching basic literacy (based on average test scores in math and science, primary through end of secondary school; (13) Years of
schoolingShare of top-performing students (based on average test scores in math and science, primary through end of secondary school, all years).
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a very similar result to that obtained by Ashraf and Galor (2013: Table 1), when testing the
relationship between genetic diversity and development (using the log of population density
as dependent variable).
According to our estimates, a 1 percentage point increase in genetic diversity for the country
with least genetic diversity in the sample would imply an increase in schooling of around
1.64 years (or 0.83 points in cognitive score) and the same increase for the country with
highest genetic diversity roughly implies a reduction in 1.53 year of school (or 0.65 points
in cognitive score). These are relevant quantitative eects, representing almost 1/3 of the
schooling average value and near 15% of the tests scores average. Moreover, the positive eect
of increased genetic diversity for lower levels is relatively higher than the negative eect of
increased genetic diversity for higher levels. The inclusion of continent dummies would cause
in our case a reduction of the positive eect of genetic diversity. If this would be the case, a
1 percentage point increase for the least diverse would cause an increase of nearly 0.6 years
in year of school (or 0.34 in cognitive score) and would cause a decrease of almost 0.2 year of
school (or 0.28 in cognitive score) for the most diverse. We will further discuss the eect of
introducing continent dummies in the robustness section.
3.1 Other Controls
We will now test the robustness of the empirical relationship we described earlier to the
introduction of several dierent controls. We proceed as follows. First, we introduced in a
(not-shown) regression for School all the covariates which Ashraf and Galor (2013) tested for
income (see their Table 7). From those we selected the statistical signicant coecients (at the
10% level).3 Selected covariates were social infrastructure and the percentage of population in
risk of contracting malaria. These are in fact the most related variables to the expropriation
risk of returns from human capital. Firstly, social infrastructure intends to measure wedges
between private and social returns (this variable was originally due to Hall and Jones 1999).
The higher the wedges, the less incentives to accumulate human capital. Social Infrastructure
is measured by an index of government anti-diversion policies (GADP) created from data
assembled by a rm that specializes in providing assessments of risk to international investors,
Political Risk Services. Specically it is a composed indicator of law and order, bureaucratic
quality, corruption, risk of expropriation and government repudiation of contracts. The second
element of Social Infrastructure captures the extent to which a country is open to international
trade. This may also be related to human capital investment as it can measure the extent to
which human capital is subject to competition from human capital producing good abroad.
Moreover, the risk of contracting malaria (originally from Gallup and Sachs, 2001) is directly
related to disability and death thus providing a direct eect of expropriation of potential
returns from human capital.
In Table 4 we note that despite of these two new covariates being highly statistically
signicant in distribution of human capital across countries, with a positive eect of Social
Infrastructure and a negative eect of the percentage of population in risk of contracting
malaria, the hump-shaped relationship between the dierent measures of human capital and
genetic diversity is maintained with high statistical signicance for most of human capital
3Not shown results are available upon request. We adopted this strategy for parsimoniousness. However
the inclusion of non-signicant variables would not change our main results.
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Figure 1: The hump-shaped Relationship between Human Capital and Genetic Diversity
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Figure 2: The hump-shaped Relationship between Human Capital and Genetic Diversity (Mo-
bility Adjusted)
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Table 3: Restricted Regressions
Dep. Var. Diversity Var. (x) Coef. for x (s:e) Coef. for x2 (s:e) R2 N
(1) school pdiv aa 1390,8*** (329,7) -989,5*** (231,0) 0.1291 123
(2) kskh pdiv aa 1128,9*** (236,3) -793,0*** (165,7) 0.1770 73
(3) m sec15c pdiv aa 47,9*** (15,4) -34,2*** (10,8) 0.0943 94
(4) m tyr15 pdiv aa 1265,3*** (333,0) -909,2*** (233,7) 0.1525 94
(5) m tyr1564 pdiv aa 1350,9*** (356,6) -969,4*** (250,2) 0.1482 94
(6) cognitive pdiv aa 654,2*** (90,7) -460,9*** (64,3) 0.2747 71
(7) lowsec pdiv aa 667,8*** (96,7) -470,7*** (68,6) 0.2476 71
(8) basic pdiv aa 243,1*** (33,4) -170,9*** (23,7) 0.2933 71
(9) top pdiv aa 47,5*** (10,6) -33,7*** (7,5) 0.2235 71
(10) schoolxcognitive pdiv aa 10805,5*** (3882,7) -7585,1*** (2735,6) 0.1436 63
(11) schoolxlowsec pdiv aa 10938,9*** (3909,9) -7680,8*** (2754,4) 0.1442 63
(12) schoolxbasic pdiv aa 2508,7*** (733,9) -1759,0*** (517,1) 0.1950 63
(13) schoolxtop pdiv aa 350,5*** (97,9) -247,4*** (69,1) 0.1620 63
(1) school pdivhmi aa 790,1*** (216,4) -566,8*** (152,3) 0.0874 96
(2) kskh pdivhmi aa 820,6*** (163,6) -575,0*** (114,7) 0.2163 58
(3) m sec15c pdivhmi aa 25,7** (10,9) -18,5** (7,7) 0.0695 73
(4) m tyr15 pdivhmi aa 593,7*** (222,0) -436,1*** (156,8) 0.1141 73
(5) m tyr1564 pdivhmi aa 649,9*** (237,7) -475,9*** (167,8) 0.1106 73
(6) cognitive pdivhmi aa 434,8*** (61,4) -307,4*** (44,1) 0.2617 57
(7) lowsec pdivhmi aa 430,1*** (63,9) -303,9*** (45,9) 0.2263 57
(8) basic pdivhmi aa 160,7*** (22,6) -113,3*** (16,3) 0.2669 57
(9) top pdivhmi aa 29,8*** (7,6) -21,2*** (5,4) 0.2074 57
(10) schoolxcognitive pdivhmi aa 7721,6*** (2543,8) -5456,0*** (1802,8) 0.1512 49
(11) schoolxlowsec pdivhmi aa 7762,2*** (2558,7) -5485,1*** (1812,8) 0.1508 49
(12) schoolxbasic pdivhmi aa 1776,2*** (478,6) -1251,9*** (339,5) 0.2035 49
(13) schoolxtop pdivhmi aa 233,7*** (73,3) -165,2*** (51,7) 0.1784 49
Note: Dependent Variables - (1) Years of schooling; (2) Years of schoolingInterpersonal Trust; (3) % of population aged 15 or over with complete
secondary education; (4) Years of schooling of population 15 and over, whether studying or not; (5) Years of schooling of population 15-64 who is
not studying; (6) Average test score in math and science, primary through end of secondary school, all years (scaled to PISA scale divided by 100);
(7) Average test score in math and science, only lower secondary, all years (scaled to PISA scale divided by 100); (8) Share of students reaching
basic literacy (based on average test scores in math and science, primary through end of secondary school, all years); (9) Share of top-performing
students (based on average test scores in math and science, primary through end of secondary school, all years); (10) Years of schoolingAverage
test score in math and science, primary through end of secondary school; (11) Years of schoolingAverage test score in math and science, only lower
secondary; (12) Years of schoolingShare of students reaching basic literacy (based on average test scores in math and science, primary through end
of secondary school; (13) Years of schoolingShare of top-performing students (based on average test scores in math and science, primary through
end of secondary school, all years).
* means signicant at 10% level, ** means signicant at 5% level and *** means signicant at 1% level. Heteroscedasticity robust standard-errors
are reported in parenthesis. pdiv aa means Predicted genetic diversity ancestry adjusted and pdivhmi aa means Mobility index-predicted genetic
diversity ancestry adjusted.
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Table 4: Human Capital and Genetic Diversity (other controls)
Predicted
genetic
diversity
Predicted
genetic
diversity
square
Social
infrastruc-
ture
% of
population
at risk of
contract-
ing
malaria
R2/Observations
(1) 364.64** -252.45** 5.34*** -2.6*** 0.65
(166.84) (119.16) (0.83) (0.55) 100
(2) 316.29* -217.81* 3.64*** -0.69** 0.54
(161.02) (114.55) (0.61) (0.27) 61
(3) 6.34 -4.06 0.25*** -0.1*** 0.51
(10.69) (7.61) (0.05) (0.03) 91
(4) 189.2 -129.92 6.65*** -2.71*** 0.71
(189.09) (135.25) (0.85) (0.58) 91
(5) 197.30 -134.29 7.24*** -2.81*** 0.72
(196.92) (140.84) (0.89) (0.61) 91
(6) 361.10*** -253.80*** 1.17*** -0.41 0.55
(104.54) (74.14) (0.28) (0.28) 57
(7) 371.53*** -261.49*** 1.19*** -0.54 0.52
(108.75) (77.13) (0.30) (0.35) 57
(8) 147.11*** -103.07*** 0.39*** -0.09 0.51
(44.96) (31.94) (0.11) (0.11 57
(9) 24.93*** -17.71*** 0.08*** -0.05** 0.48
(7.49) (5.36) (0.02) (0.02) 57
(10) 4991.90** -3509.42** 25.90*** -19.98*** 0.52
(2288.12) (1630.76) (5.88) (6.58) 53
(11) 5113.63** -3597.50** 26.05*** -20.62*** 0.53
(2298.49) (1637.63) (5.92) (6.53) 53
(12) 1256.36*** -879.96*** 5.64*** -3.57*** 0.58
(440.16) (313.88) (1.14) (1.19) 53
(13) 192.82*** -136.49*** 0.72*** -0.55** 0.49
(66.63) (47.54) (0.18) (0.22) 53
Note: Dependent Variables - (1) Years of schooling; (2) Years of schoolingInterpersonal Trust; (3) % of population aged 15 or over with complete
secondary education; (4) Years of schooling of population 15 and over, whether studying or not; (5) Years of schooling of population 15-64 who is
not studying; (6) Average test score in math and science, primary through end of secondary school, all years (scaled to PISA scale divided by 100);
(7) Average test score in math and science, only lower secondary, all years (scaled to PISA scale divided by 100); (8) Share of students reaching
basic literacy (based on average test scores in math and science, primary through end of secondary school, all years); (9) Share of top-performing
students (based on average test scores in math and science, primary through end of secondary school, all years); (10) Years of schoolingAverage
test score in math and science, primary through end of secondary school; (11) Years of schoolingAverage test score in math and science, only lower
secondary; (12) Years of schoolingShare of students reaching basic literacy (based on average test scores in math and science, primary through end
of secondary school; (13) Years of schoolingShare of top-performing students (based on average test scores in math and science, primary through
end of secondary school, all years).
Level of signicance: *** for p-value<0.01; **for p-value<0.05;* for p-value<0.1.
Values between parentheses are standard errors.
9
variables, with exceptions being % of population with secondary school (m sec15c) and years
of schooling in population above 15 years old (m tyr15 and m tyr1564). With m sec15c there
is a marginally signicant linear eect (when pdiv aa squared is dropped). Results that use
the alternative measure of genetic diversity (predicted through the human mobility index -
pdivhmi aa) are presented in Table A.1 in the Appendix and conclusions are in line with the
previous ones. It is interesting to note that the quantitative eect of genetic diversity is now
smaller than that emerged from the restricted regressions. In fact, an 1% point increase in the
lowest genetic diversity would imply 0.52 years (nearly 6 months) more in schooling (and 0.46
additional points in school variable) and would imply nearly 3.5 months less schooling (and
less 0.35 points in `cognitive' score) if the country departs from the highest levels of genetic
diversity. The higher eects of increased diversity for lower levels than for higher levels is now
slightly increased.
3.2 A Proxy for Human Capital in 1500
Ashraf and Galor (2013) focus their paper in explaining development in 1500 due to genetic
diversity. Thus their measure of genetic diversity in 1500 restricts attention to the development
outcomes in the pre-colonial era when, arguably, regional populations were indigenous to their
current geographic location. Specically, in light of the serial founder eect, the presence of
multiple indigenous ethnicities in a given region would have had a negligible impact on the
diversity of the regional population during this period (Ashraf and Galor, 2013: 4). In face
of our objective of explaining the relationship between human capital and genetic diversity, it
would be interesting to see if the hump-shaped relationship we have described above between
current levels of human capital and predicted genetic diversity for 2000, would also be veried
for 1500. To this end, our main challenge would be to nd variables (with extensive coverage
around the world) to measure human capital. As Allen (2003) and Reis (2002) show there is
not a direct measure for human capital in 1500 and some rough proxies such as wages could
be obtained only for a few European countries, as in Allen (2003). Literacy rate (the ability
to sign) could be collected by Reis (2002) for 12 European countries but only around 1800.
As this author argued \For earlier periods, the data is patchier and less reliable and therefore
the long run trends are hard to identify except for in a few countries." (p.18). Also, most
of the schools and education in the Middle-ages based exclusively on religious contents and
even literacy (capacity to read) come from the need to learn how to read the Bible and other
religious books (see e.g. Houston, 2002). So literacy or schooling measures to proxy human
capital in 1500 must be excluded due to lack of data with extensive coverage. Moreover, if
it could be collected for few countries, its measure would hardly be matched with nowadays
concept of human capital. Firstly, it excludes knowledge directly linked with productive skills,
due to apprenticeship, training and experience. Second, it is very directed to religious thought.
Thus, we thought that alternative available proxies may be linked with human capital. As
Aiyar et. al. (2008) puts it \the distinction between technology and human capital was much
less clear cut in pre-industrial times than it is today. In modern societies it is feasible and
often useful to treat the two as conceptually dierent. Human capital is inherently linked to
the human body, whereas technological knowledge blueprints can be stored outside humans,
in computers and books. But before the advent of the printing press and widespread liter-
acy, technological knowledge would have to be embodied primarily in humans, and actively
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transmitted across generations in order to be preserved in society."(p. 127). So if we use
technology measures in 1500, we may have a good proxy for embodied knowledge, meaning
a close denition to what we consider nowadays human capital. Fortunately, Comin et. al.
(2010) has come with a database on technologies on dierent elds that could be used for
our purposes. The database covers the technology usage (or not) in each country (in 1500)
for agriculture, transportation, communication, industry, military and an average sector (the
average of previous sectoral indexes).
We relate each of the variables for 1500 (as dependent variables) with genetic diversity, using
as controls all the variables used by Ashraf and Galor (2013) in their benchmark regressions.
Tables 5 and A.2 show the results. All regressions present an impressive robust relationship
between genetic diversity and our proxies for human capital. In particular it also draws the
so-called hump-shaped relationship between genetic diversity and human capital. The cutting
point above which the marginal eect of increases in genetic diversity begins to be negative
is around 0.7, exactly the same as above, with the 2000 data for human capital. An increase
in 1 percentage point (0.01) in genetic diversity for countries with the lowest genetic diversity
would imply an increase in 0.050 score for agriculture, 0.055 for communications, 0.031 for
transportation, 0.083 for industry, 0.038 for military and 0.052 for the average sector. This
represents sizeable eects given that the human capital proxies are measured between 0 and 1,
corresponding to values between 3.1% (transportation) to 8.3% (industry). For those countries
with the highest genetic diversity, a further increase in 0.01 in diversity would cause decreases
in human capital from 0.02 (2.3%) in transportation to 0.09 (9.1%) in agriculture. There
is evidence of a relatively higher positive eect of diversity on human capital for all sectors,
except for agriculture, where the negative eect of increasing genetic diversity is higher for
high levels of diversity than the positive eect that occurs in low levels of genetic diversity. The
only exceptions for the hump-shaped robust relationship are for transportation and military
associated knowledge when genetic diversity is adjusted with the human capital mobility index
(Table A.2). However, in both that cases, it can be shown that there is a robust linear
relationship between genetic diversity and human capital, meaning that an increase in 1% in
genetic diversity (for all levels of diversity) would imply increases in human capital linked with
transportation in 1.4% and with military in 1.8%. Most signicant variables in determining the
distribution of these proxies of human capital around the word, apart from genetic diversity,
are the Neolithic transition time and absolute latitude.
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4 Robustness
One of the tests provided on Ashraf and Galor (2013) was the inclusion of continent dum-
mies. These continent dummies can account for other determinants of human capital other
that genetic diversity and the other controls introduced in previous regressions, which may
be continent-specic. Broadly speaking, we still obtain statistical signicant hump-shaped
eect of genetic diversity and human capital both for 2000 and 1500.4 For 2000, we followed
the strategy described above to select a meaningful specication. Departing from an initial
regression for school, we tested the signicance of all the covariates also used by Ashraf and
Galor (2013), introducing continent dummies into the regression. Then we selected variables
with signicant coecients (at the 10% level), maintaining continent dummies. One of the
signicant variables is now dierent from the selected above: The percentage of population in
risk of contracting malaria is now replaced by the percentage of population living in tropical
zones. Almost all the human capital variables maintain the hump-shaped robust relationship
with genetic diversity. In fact, when compared with the conclusions drawn from the results
in Table 4, the dierences are the following: the years of education for population above 15
variables are now linearly related to genetic diversity, with 5% and 10% statistical signicance,
meaning a small eect of nearly 2 months of schooling due to an increase of 1% in genetic
diversity. Moreover, the hump-shaped robust (and also the linear one) relationship with the
some of the adjusted human capital measures (for tests scores - cognitive and lowsec - and for
social capital, kskh) disappears with the introduction of continent dummies. The results with
the human mobility index adjustment for genetic diversity conrm all the results described
above but recovers the highly signicant (at 5%) hump-shaped relationship between genetic
diversity and the social capital adjusted measure of human capital. Generally, a 1% increase
in the lowest level of diversity imply an increase in schooling of nearly 7 months (and of 0.34
in test scores) and a 1% diversity increase in the highest level would imply a decrease of 2.6
months in schooling (0.28 in test scores).
To further address robustness of our main result, we may argue that there is a causal
relationship between genetic diversity and human capital in the post-1500 era. However,
genetic diversity may be also an endogenous outcome of geographic areas with more human
capital, as genetic diversity could have been improved through migration from less knowledge-
endowed areas to more knowledge-endowed areas (specic examples of those migration were
the barbaric invasions of the Roman Empire or the colonization of Africa). On the contrary,
well endowed areas were able also to construct barriers to deter colonization (e.g. the China's
Great Wall or Roman Legions for centuries). The question is if these type of migrations were
in fact increasing genetic diversity, so as genetic diversity and human capital may be outcomes
of some other determinants of development and thus genetic diversity could not be regarded
as exogenous towards human capital nowadays. To minimize the endogeneity problem Ashraf
and Galor (2013) constructed a measure of predicted genetic diversity based on \physical"
distance from East Africa, which was the variable we have been used in the paper. As the
authors put it \given the obvious exogeneity of migratory distance from East Africa with
respect to development outcomes in the Common Era, the use of migratory distance to project
genetic diversity alleviates concerns regarding the potential endogeneity between observed
genetic diversity and economic development (...) Specically, the identifying assumption being
4Results are available upon request.
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employed here is that distances along prehistoric human migration routes from Africa have no
direct eect on economic development during the Common Era." Ashraf and Galor (2013: 6,
14).
In what follows, following what was done by Ashraf and Galor (2013) to test exogeneity
towards development (the log of population density), we tested the exogeneity of observed
genetic diversity in explaining human capital around the world. Firstly, we have regressed
the average sectoral human capital index in 1500 (tr3) on observed genetic diversity (linear
and square terms) migratory distances from East Africa (linear and square terms) together
with Log Neolithic transition time, Log percentage of arable land, Log absolute latitude,
Log land suitability for agriculture and continental dummies. The linear and squared terms of
observed genetic diversity are signicant at 5% and both terms on distance are non-signicant.
We repeat the procedure substituting distances with the mobility index (linear and squared
terms). This means that when considering genetic diversity and distances or migrations as
potentially simultaneous determinants of human capital development, we end out concluding
that genetic diversity is always statistically stronger as a candidate to explain human capital.
Secondly, we replicated 2SLS regression the authors have presented in their Table 2, column
(6) but now with the average sectoral human capital index in 1500 (tr3) we have used earlier,
as the dependent variable. This serves as a test for exogeneity of of observed genetic diversity
for the smaller sample. Given that the observed genetic diversity could be established as
exogenous, then the predicted genetic diversity would be reasonably considered as exogenous
by the arguments exposed earlier. This will be column (1) in our robustness Table 6.
However, we want to document further that the hump-shaped relationship between human
capital and genetic diversity (both in 2000 and 1500) can be regarded as a causal relation-
ship. Thus, we used the geographical aerial distances to East Africa, terrestrial distances to
London and Mexico as instruments to the predicted genetic diversity for the larger sample.
In fact, geographical distances to given points in the Word, despite being highly correlated
with predicted genetic diversity (remember that terrestrial distances to East Africa were used
to construct predicted genetic diversity, departing from observed genetic diversity), they are
not reasonably assumed to be, by themselves, direct determinants of human capital invest-
ment many centuries after prehistoric migration routes. Thus geographical distances are good
candidates to instrument the predicted genetic diversity. Columns (2) and (3) present 2SLS
regressions for the average sectoral human capital index in 1500 (tr3) and columns (4) and
(5) present 2SLS regressions for schooling years (School) and test scores (Cognitive). Note
that while in columns for the 1500 dependent variables we introduce a set of covariates that
are arguably exogenous, in the 2000 regressions, we avoided the introduction of more controls,
because its own exogeneity might be at sake (e.g. the social infrastructure measure).
There are two main issues with validity of IV estimates, one is the possibility of weak
instruments, this is, instruments that are not suciently correlated with the instrumented
variables, the other is adequate instruments, e.g., their potential correlation with the error
term. We accounted for both problems in our estimations. Firstly, we have carefully analysed
all the rst-step regressions for highly signicance of regressors. Secondly, we have analysed the
result of the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic for under-identication (insucient instruments),
the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic for weak-identication (weak instruments). We also used
the Stock-Wright LM S statistic for the joint signicance of endogenous variables in the main
regression, which is a test of robust inference, robust to weak instruments. If this test is
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rejected this means that, instruments can be used to explain the dependent variable, not only
through the instrumented variable. In our case this would mean that distance could be used to
explain human capital (see the discussion above about the exclusion of migratory distance as a
predictor of human capital development several centuries later). Thirdly, we have analysed the
Hansan J-statistic to test for adequate instruments. For a good IV regression, all the tests but
the the Stock-Wright LM S statistic and J-statistic should reject. Fourthly, we have analysed
a endogenity test, which indicates whether we can treat genetic diversity as exogenous in the
context of the regressed equations. Column (1) show us a regression for the restricted sample
(which were not used until now). It used the observed genetic diversity (which were used by
Ashraf and Galor (2013) to predict genetic diversity in the enlarged country sample). We
follow strictly the instrumentation technique followed by the author. We reach a statistically
signicant hump-shaped inuence of genetic diversity into human capital in which all the other
predictors of human capital are also statistically signicant. The tests indicate that we can
reject the hypothesis that instruments are weak.
Columns (2) and (3) present regressions for the enlarged sample in which we used predicted
genetic diversity to predict human capital in 1500. The results reveal the same robust rela-
tionship, the tests indicate that instruments are not weak and are not correlated to the error
term. Thus, inference can be done. However, contrary to what happen in column (1) the
endogeneity test indicates now that statistically predicted genetic diversity cannot be treated
as exogenous. Columns (4) and (5) presents examples of regressions for the enlarged sample
in which we used predicted genetic diversity to predict human capital in 2000. The results
reveal the same robust relationship, the tests indicate that instruments are not weak and are
not correlated to the error term, which clearly indicates that inference can be done. In fact,
in these cases, the endogeneity test indicates that the predicted genetic diversity could indeed
have been treated as exogenous. It is also worth noting that quantitatively the coecients
that dene the hump-shaped relationship between human capital and genetic diversity are
not sizeably dierent from the coecients estimated by OLS earlier in the paper, being the
greater quantitative dierence those of coecients in Columns (2) and (3). It is striking that
the threshold level above which genetic diversity causes human capital to diminish is almost
similar as before, 0.7!
We have experimented several specications for the dierent human capital variables we
have studied above (both for 1500 and 2000) and from all experiments it was possible to
demonstrate that genetic diversity can be regarded as causing human capital rises for low
levels of diversity and as causing human capital drops for high values of genetic diversity.5
5We ran several regressions for 1500 and 2000. For 1500, despite in the regression for the average sectoral
human capital the predicted diversity does not appear to be statistically exogenous, for the human capital as-
sociated with agriculture, communications and industry, the endogeneity test does not reject. For these human
capital proxies IV regression are also well-behaved regarding the instruments properties and the hump-shaped
relationship is revealed. For 2000, almost all the results suggest that predicted genetic diversity (ancestrally
adjusted) can be treated as exogenous within regressions that use the same instrument set as in columns (4)
and (5) in Table 6 - exceptions are only for years of schooling for population above 15 years old and for the
share of students with top scores in tests (m tyr15, m tyr1564 and top). Despite that, even for the exceptions,
it is possible to nd instrument sets that allow for the endogeneity test to fail rejection (accepting that instru-
mented variables can be treated as exogenous). Moreover, most variables linked with human capital in 2000 are
robustly related to the predicted genetic diversity (ancestrally adjusted) - in the typical hump-shaped manner
in regressions specied as those in Tables (4) and (5). More important than that, for those variables that could
not be statistically treated as exogenous (the three mentioned above), it is possible to specify well-behaved IV
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Table 6: Human Capital and Genetic Diversity (2SLS estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent
Var.
Average HC
1500
Average HC
1500
Average HC
1500
School
Cognitive
School
Observed
Diversity
42.1** (0.048) { { { {
Observed
Diversity
Square
-34.8* (0.051) { { { {
Predicted
Diversity
{ 29.0*** (0.001) 28.8*** (0.001) 873.0** (0.014) 8008** (0.041)
Predicted
Diversity
Square
{ -21.0*** (0.001) -20.9*** (0.001) -614.6** (0.013) -5674** (0.041)
Log Neolitic
Transition
Time
0.22*** (0.004) 0.22*** (0.000) 0.22*** (0.000) { {
Log
Percentage
Arable Land
0.14*** (0.003) 0.05*** (0.006) 0.05*** (0.006) { {
Log Absolute
Latitude
0.06*** (0.003) 0.03* (0.056) 0.01* (0.056) { {
Log Land
Suit. for
Agriculture
0.06* (0.051) 0.03* (0.079) 0.02* (0.076) { {
Kleibergen-
Paap rk LM
statistic
5.7** (0.017) 41.2*** (0.000) 41.7*** (0.000) 31.6*** (0.000) 14.7** (0.041)
Cragg-Donald
Wald F
statistic
4.6 446.8yyy (11.04) 353.7yyy (13.97) 8.9y (6.20) 9.7y (6.20)
Stock-Wright
LM S statistic
2.8 (0.242) 8.8* (0.066) 8.9 (0.112) 12.9 (0.116) 7.8 (0.453)
Hansen
J-Statistic
exact. id. 1.57 (0.457) 1.59 (0.662) 6.91 (0.330) 7.25 (0.299)
Endog. Test 3.16 (0.206) 10.68 (0.005) 16.88 (0.000) 2.49 (0.288) 3.40 (0.183)
N 19 106 106 123 63
Note: Excluded Instruments - (1) 2 instruments: First-stage tted values of observed genetic diversity (square) and migratory distance from East
Africa, equation is exactly identied; (2) 4 instruments: aerial distance from East Africa, aerial distance from East Africa (square), terrestrial
distance from London and terrestrial distance from London (square); (3) 5 instruments: the same as in column (3) plus Geodesic Centroid Latitude;
(4) and (5): 8 instruments: aerial distance from East Africa, aerial distance from East Africa (square), terrestrial distance from London, Tokyo and
Mexico, terrestrial distance from London, Tokyo and Mexico (square). Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic tests underidentication, under the null of
the matrix of reduced form coecients has rank=K1-1. Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic tests the null under which equation is weakly identied. This
is compared with the Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values, which are reported in parenthesis in that line. Stock-Wright LM S statistic tests the
null under which the joint endogenous regressors have null coecients. Hansen J-Statistic tests the null under which the instruments are valid, i.e.,
uncorrelated with the error term.
Level of signicance: *** for p-value<0.01; **for p-value<0.05;* for p-value<0.1.  in column (1) 4.58 is the critical value for 15% critical IV size;
y y y in columns (2) and (3), 11.04 is the critical value for relative IV bias of 5% (of the OLS bias); y in column (4) and (5), 6.20 is the critical value
for relative IV bias of 20% (of the OLS bias).
Values inside parentheses are standard errors, except for the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic. All regressions include continent dummies.
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5 Conclusion
We build on Ashraf and Galor (2013) to determine the inuence of genetic diversity in one of
the most important sources of development: human capital. Thus we constructed a database
of human capital variables coming from Cohen and Soto (2007) - for measures of quantity of
human capital and from Hanushek and Woessmann, 2012 - for measures of quality of human
capital and then merged it with the database of genetic diversity, from Ashraf and Galor
(2013). We found a hump-shaped relationship between human capital and genetic diversity.
A 1% change in low levels of genetic diversity may imply large eects in schooling that can
oscillate between 4 to 136 months of schooling (0.34 to 0.46 points in international tests scores)
and negative eects when there is high genetic diversity (2 to 10 months of schooling and near
0.3 points in scores).
We have also tested proxies for human capital in 1500. Given the diculty in obtaining
reliable data about literacy or schooling in that year, we argue that the measures of technology
adoption from Comin et. al. (2010) are indeed good proxies for human capital given the
embodied nature of knowledge in these days. In fact, we found again a statistically robust
hump-shaped relationship between human capital in 1500 and genetic diversity. Quantitative
eects are also relevant: a 1% increase in low levels of diversity can account for increases in
2.8% to 5.2% in average human capital in 1500 and a similar increase in high levels of diversity
account for reductions in human capital that range from near 1.6% to 4.8%. This dismisses
the Comin et. al. (2010) conclusion according to technology adoption (our proxy for embodied
knowledge or human capital in 1500) is not related to population or genetic characteristics, as
we found evidence of a strong relationship between these measures and genetic diversity.
The main measures used to measure genetic diversity were calculated using observed genetic
diversity and migratory distances from East Africa. As it is not reasonable to assume that
migratory distances from East Africa would have an eect in the after-1500 human capital
outcomes, that variable can be regarded as exogenous. Thus given the exogeneity of observed
genetic diversity, the exogeneity of predicted genetic diversity (the variable we use in our
main regression) follows. Thus, we tested the exogeneity of observed genetic diversity to a
regression for 1500 human capital and we show and discuss a number of robustness tests with
instrumental variables regressions. The overall conclusion is that the hump-shaped relationship
between human capital and genetic diversity (both in 2000 and 1500) can indeed be regarded
as a causal relationship. Thus post-1500 human capital outcomes may have been determined
centuries ago, when great human migrations shaped the nowadays countries genetic diversity.
models that highlight the robust hump-shaped relationship with predicted genetic diversity.
6Using the most preferable specications (Tables 4 and 6 and regressions with controls and continent
dummies).
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Table A.1: Human Capital and Genetic Diversity (other controls)
Mobility
index-
predicted
genetic
diversity
Mobility
index-
predicted
genetic
diversity
square
Social
infrastruc-
ture
% of
population
at risk of
contract-
ing
malaria
R2 / Ob-
servations
(1) 227.93** -156.42** 5.82*** -2.53*** 0.70
(105.18) (74.28) (0.90) (0.55) 78
(2) 248.92*** -168.62*** 3.61*** -0.80*** 0.70
(86.44) (61.35) (0.58) (0.25) 47
(3) 7.19 -4.70 0.25*** -0.10*** 0.52
(8.04) (5.64) (0.06) (0.03) 72
(4) 89.17 -59.07 7.19*** -2.65*** 0.74
(133.93) (95.45) (0.86) (0.56) 72
(5) 108.63 -71.69 7.78*** -2.75*** 0.75
(139.96) (99.64) (0.90) (0.59) 72
(6) 284.70*** -200.08*** 1.08*** -0.36 0.51
(73.03) (52.64) (0.27) (0.30) 44
(7) 279.69*** -196.47*** 1.10*** -0.47 0.47
(75.24) (54.18) (0.29) (0.39) 44
(8) 113.78*** -79.84*** 0.37*** -0.06 0.46
(32.74) (23.65) (0.11) (0.13) 44
(9) 16.02** -11.26** 0.079*** -0.05*** 0.49
(6.27) (4.48) (0.02) (0.02) 44
(10) 3856.87** -2717.58** 28.06*** -23.38*** 0.61
(1598.96) (1146.60) (5.78) (6.96) 40
(11) 3879.79** -2733.94** 28.19*** -23.82*** 0.61
(1611.17) (1154.79) (5.83) (6.88) 40
(12) 933.54*** -654.01*** 6.08*** -4.03*** 0.65
(298.61) (215.11) (1.11) (1.21) 40
(13) 116.71** -81.54** 0.77*** -0.55** 0.55
(51.31) (36.55) (0.16) (0.21) 40
Note: Dependent Variables - (1) Years of schooling; (2) Years of schoolingInterpersonal Trust; (3) % of population aged 15 or over with complete
secondary education; (4) Years of schooling of population 15 and over, whether studying or not; (5) Years of schooling of population 15-64 who is
not studying; (6) Average test score in math and science, primary through end of secondary school, all years (scaled to PISA scale divided by 100);
(7) Average test score in math and science, only lower secondary, all years (scaled to PISA scale divided by 100); (8) Share of students reaching
basic literacy (based on average test scores in math and science, primary through end of secondary school, all years); (9) Share of top-performing
students (based on average test scores in math and science, primary through end of secondary school, all years); (10) Years of schoolingAverage
test score in math and science, primary through end of secondary school; (11) Years of schoolingAverage test score in math and science, only lower
secondary; (12) Years of schoolingShare of students reaching basic literacy (based on average test scores in math and science, primary through end
of secondary school; (13) Years of schoolingShare of top-performing students (based on average test scores in math and science, primary through
end of secondary school, all years).
Level of signicance: *** for p-value<0.01; **for p-value<0.05;* for p-value<0.1.
Values between parentheses are standard errors.
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